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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND COMPENSATION
IN SOUTH AFRICA
L.C. COETZEE* AND PIETER CARSTENS**
I. THE OVERALL SCHEME FOR PREVENTING AND REDRESSING MEDICAL
ERRORS AND ADVERSE EVENTS, INCLUDING REGULATION, CRIMINAL AND.
CIVIL LIABILITY, AND SOCIAL AND PRIVATE INSURANCE, AND THE
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THESE VARIOUS SYSTEMS
A. Regulatory Methods'
1. Government Licensing Authorities for Doctors and Hospitals
The practice of the medical profession in the Republic of South Africa
is primarily regulated by a number of statutory enactments. 2 The most im-
portant statute governing medical practice is the Health Professions Act.3
The Act provides for the establishment of the Health Professions Council
of South Africa (HPCSA), the statutory regulatory body responsible for,
inter alia, controlling and exercising "authority in respect of all matters
affecting the training of persons in, and the manner of the exercise of the
practices pursued in connection with, the diagnosis, treatment or prevention
of physical or mental defects, illnesses or deficiencies in human kind."4
Briefly, the Act provides for control over the education, training, registra-
tion, and practices of a variety of health professionals. 5
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa; B.L.C., University
of Pretoria; LL.B., University of Pretoria; LL.M., University of South Africa.
** Professor in Medical and Criminal Law, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa; B.L.C.,
University of Pretoria; LL.B., University of Pretoria; LL.D., University of Pretoria.
1. See generally P. CARSTENS & D. PEARMAIN, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN
MEDICAL LAW 249-81 (2007); Sybrand A. Strauss, South Africa, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA
OF LAWS 45-58 (Herman Nys ed., 2007).
2. Apart from the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and the
provisions of the common law.
3. Health Professions Act 56 of 1974.
4. Id. §§ 2, 3.
5. Id. § 3. The Act can be characterised as the "charter" of the medical practitioner in South
Africa. However, it also governs the practice of dentistry, psychology, and a variety of supplementary
health services apart from nursing, midwifery, pharmacy, homeopathy, chiropractic, traditional healing
and the like. Id § 17. Ministerial regulations governing topics ranging from the registration of students
through disciplinary control over professionals have been promulgated from time to time under the Act.
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The Health Professions Act provides for the establishment of "a pro-
fessional board with regard to any profession in respect of which a register
is kept in terms of [the] Act," by the Minister of Health acting on the rec-
ommendation of the HPCSA. 6 Twelve such boards have thus far been es-
tablished.7 Within the context of the present discussion, the Medical and
Dental Professional Board (MDPB)-responsible for all registered medical
and dental practitioners, and the training of medical and dental students 8-
needs to be mentioned specifically. Legally, the professional boards fall
under the overall control of the HPCSA, although, de facto, they function
largely independently. 9
No person may practise within the Republic of South Africa as a
medical practitioner unless he or she is registered in terms of the Health
Professions Act.10 The Minister of Health may, on the recommendation of
the HPCSA and the relevant professional board, "by regulation define the
scope of any other health profession registrable in terms of [the Health
Professions] Act by specifying the acts which shall for the purposes of the
application of [the] Act be deemed to be acts pertaining to that profes-
sion."ll Such regulation may only be made, however, after the relevant
professional board "has been given the opportunity of submitting ... rec-
ommendations as to the definition of the scope of the profession in ques-
tion."12
The Health Professions Act prohibits any person from practising
within South Africa any health profession the scope of which has been
defined by the Minister, unless he or she is registered in terms of the Act in
respect of such profession.13 Contravention of this provision amounts to an
offencel 4 which is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for a period not
exceeding twelve months, or both a fine and such imprisonment.15
The HPCSA is the statutory regulatory body responsible for exercising
control over medical practitioners, dentists, psychologists, and certain cate-
gories of medical personnel, such as physiotherapists, radiographers, medi-
6. Id. § 15.
7. Professional Boards, HEALTH PROFESSIONS COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA, http://www.hpcsa.
co.za/boardoverview.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
8. Professional Boards: Medical & Dental, HEALTH PROFESSIONS COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA,
http://www.hpcsa.co.za/board-Meddent.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
9. Strauss, supra note 1, at 45.
10. Health Professions Act § 17(1)(a).
I1. Id. § 33(1).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 34(l). This prohibition is subject to the provisions of sections 32(c) and 39. Id.
14. Id § 34(2).
15. Id. § 39(2).
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cal technologists, optometrists, and emergency care personnel. Our courts
have recognised that the HPCSA is in effect the sole repository of the
power to decide what is ethical and what is unethical in medical practice.16
The HPCSA is also acknowledged as:
[Truly a statutory custos morum of the medical profession, the guardian
of the prestige, status and dignity of the profession and the public interest
in so far as members of the public are affected by the conduct of mem-
bers of the profession to whom they had stood in a professional relation-
ship.17
The HPCSA has wide powers under the Health Professions Act, and
may, inter alia, perform the following actions: "render financial assistance
to professional boards to enable them to perform their functions"; consider,
after consultation with the relevant professional board, "any matter affect-
ing the professions registrable with the [HPCSA]"; consistent with national
health policy determined by the Minister, "make representations or take
such action in connection therewith as the [HPCSAJ deems advisable";
"delegate to any committee or any person such of its powers as it may from
time to time determine"; and "make rules on all matters which the
[HPCSA] considers necessary or expedient in order that the objects of [the
Health Professions] Act may be achieved."' 8 Importantly, the HPCSA is
empowered to establish such committees as it may deem necessary,19 in-
cluding disciplinary committees, and is obliged to establish ad hoc discipli-
nary appeal committees. 20 It may delegate to any committee such of its
powers as it may from time to time determine, but is not divested of any
power so delegated. 21 The HPCSA derives its income from registration,
examination, annual, and any other fees, payable in terms of the Health
Professions Act.22 The HPCSA is further responsible for recommending to
the Minister of Health the establishment of "a professional board with re-
gard to any health profession in respect of which a register is kept in terms
of [the Health Professions] Act." 23
16. Pretorius v. Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige & Tandheelkundige Raad 1980 (2) SA 354 (T) at
358-59; cf S. African Med. & Dental Council v. Shapiro 1954 (2) SA 578 (T) at 587; Groenewald v. S.
African Med. Council 1934 TPD 404 at 410, 416.
17. Veriava v. President of S. African Med & Dental Council 1985 (2) SA 293 (T) at 307; see
also De la Rouviere v. S. African Med & Dental Council 1977 (1) SA 85 (N) at 97; Phathela v. Chair-
man Disciplinary Comm. S. African Med & Dental Council 1995 (3) SA 179 (T) at 182; Groenewald
1934 TPD at 410.
18. Health Professions Act § 4(a)f).
19. Id. § 10(1)(a).
20. Id § 10(2).
21. Id § 10(1)(b).
22. Id § 13.
23. Id. § 15(1).
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The professional boards also have wide powers under the Act, inter
alia, the removal and restoration of names to and from a register, and the
suspension of a registered person from practising his or her profession
pending the institution of a formal inquiry; the appointment of examiners
and moderators, the conducting of examinations, and the granting of cer-
tificates; the approval of training schools; the considerations of any matter
affecting any profession falling within the ambit of the professional board,
and the making of representations or the taking of such action in connec-
tion therewith as the professional board deems advisable; and the recogni-
tion of local and foreign qualifications. 24
Professional boards have the "power to institute an inquiry into any
complaint, charge or allegation of unprofessional conduct against practitio-
ners registered under [the Health Professions] Act."25 In practice, profes-
sional boards do not conduct such inquiries themselves, but appoint a
professional conduct committee to do so. 26 The Act defines "unprofes-
sional conduct" essentially as "improper or disgraceful or dishonourable or
unworthy conduct." 27 On finding the practitioner guilty of such conduct,
the committee may impose one or other of the following penalties:
(a) a caution or a reprimand or a reprimand and a caution; or
(b) suspension for a specified period from practising or performing acts
specially pertaining to his profession; or
(c) removal of his or her name from the register;[28] or
(d) a fine not exceeding R10 000;[29] or
(e) a compulsory period of professional service as may be determined
by the professional board; or
(f) the payment of the costs of the proceedings or a restitution.30
24. Id. § 15B.
25. Id. § 41.
26. Id. Such a committee is appointed by a professional board by virtue of its powers under sec-
tion 15(5)(f) of the Act read with the regulations published in Government Notice R979 of 13 August
1999. See also section 15(5)(fA), which has been inserted into the Act after the promulgation of the
regulations.
27. Id. § 1.
28. The effect of a suspension or removal from the register is that the person concerned is dis-
qualified from carrying on his or her profession and that his or her registration certificate is deemed to
be cancelled until the period of suspension has expired or until his or her name has been restored to the
register by the professional board. Id. § 44. If an appeal is lodged against a penalty of erasure or suspen-
sion from practice, such penalty remains effective until the appeal is heard. Id. § 42(1A).
29. If, on reasonable grounds, the professional board is of the opinion, upon investigation of the
complaint, charge or allegation of unprofessional conduct against a registered practitioner, that it will
impose a fine on conviction after an inquiry, the registered practitioner may be given the option of an
admission of guilt and payment of such fine. Id. § 42(8), (9).
30. Id. § 42(1)(a)-(f).
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Any person who is aggrieved by a decision of the HPCSA, a profes-
sional board, or a disciplinary appeal committee, may appeal to the appro-
priate division of the High Court.31
2. Medico-Ethical Codes of Conduct
"Although courts of law are clearly not bound by medico-ethical
codes of conduct and medical practices when determining liability for
medical malpractice, the ethical precepts and prevailing practices of the
medical profession will be an important consideration in ascertaining what
constitutes medical malpractice." 32 There are several national and interna-
tional medico-ethical codes of conduct that govern the conduct of doctors
and the practice of medicine. In South Africa, the HPCSA must, "in consul-
tation with a professional board, from time to time make rules specifying
the acts or omissions in respect of which the professional board may take
disciplinary steps." 33 These rules of conduct-the Ethical Rules of Conduct
for Practitioners Registered Under the Health Professions Act34-constitute
the most important national medico-ethical code of conduct. It is important
to note, however, that the professional board's power of inquiry is not lim-
ited to acts or omissions specified in these rules. 35
31. Id. § 20(1).
32. Strauss, supra note 1, at 40-41; see also CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 264.
33. Health Professions Act § 49(1).
34. Proc R717 in GG29079 of 4 Aug. 2006. We do not intend to discuss in detail the rules of
conduct, but merely wish to mention the categories of rules currently pertaining to doctors and dentists
in general. These categories are the following: advertising and canvassing or touting; information to be
included on professional stationery; the naming of a practice; itinerant practice; fees and commission;
partnership and juristic persons; covering; supersession; impeding a patient from obtaining the opinion
of another practitioner or from being treated by another practitioner; casting reflections on the profes-
sional reputation of colleagues; professional confidentiality; retention of human organs; the signing of
official documents; certificates and reports and the information they should contain; issuing of prescrip-
tions; professional appointments; secret remedies; defeating or obstructing the council or board in the
performance of its duties; performance of professional acts; exploitation; medicine; financial interest in
hospitals; reporting of impairment or of unprofessional, illegal or unethical conduct; research, develop-
ment and use of chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities; and dual registration. Another medico-
ethical code of conduct worth mentioning is the guidelines on ethics for medical research of the South
African Medical Research Council (MRC). The MRC guidelines-the last complete edition of which
was the third revised edition, published in 1993-are currently being reviewed. The following five
booklets have thus far been published: BOOK 1: GUIDELINES ON ETHICS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH:
GENERAL PRINCIPLES (2002); BOOK 2: GUIDELINES ON ETHICS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH:
REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY AND GENETIC RESEARCH (2002); BOOK 3: GUIDELINES ON ETHICS FOR
MEDICAL RESEARCH: USE OF ANIMALS IN RESEARCH AND TRAINING (2004); BOOK 4: GUIDELINES ON
ETHICS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH: USE OF BIOHAZARDS AND RADIATION (2002); BOOK 5: GUIDELINES
ON ETHICS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH: HIV PREVENTIVE VACCINE RESEARCH (2003).
35. Health Professions Act § 49(1).
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3. Reporting of Medical Errors and Adverse Events to the Health
Profession Council of South Africa
Under the Ethical Rules of Conduct for Practitioners Registered Under
the Health Professions Act,36 a student, intern or practitioner is obliged to
"report any unprofessional, illegal or unethical conduct on the part of
another student, intern or practitioner." 37 Of course, prevention is better
than finding a cure, and, to this end, the Rules provide that a student, intern,
or practitioner must "report impairment in another student, intern or practi-
tioner to the board if he or she is convinced that such student, intern or
practitioner is impaired," 38 and must:
[R]eport his or her own impairment or suspected impairment to the board
concerned if he or she is aware of his or her own impairment or has been
publicly informed, or has been seriously advised by a colleague to act
appropriately to obtain help in view of an alleged or established impair-
ment.39
"Impairment" is defined in the rules to mean "a mental or physical condi-
tion which affects the competence, attitude, judgment or performance of
professional acts by a registered practitioner." 40
B. Liability Systems
The relationship between doctor or hospital and patient is essentially
governed by private law, and, to be more precise, the law of contract and
the law of delict (tort).4 1 However, public-law considerations are growing
in importance in the wake of the introduction of the 1996 Constitution and
national legislation. The majority of the South African population depends
on the public sector for health care. 42
36. Proc R717 in GG29079 of 4 Aug. 2006.
37. Id. R. 25(1)(c). Neither "unprofessional conduct" nor "unethical conduct" is defined for the
purposes of these rules. It is submitted that, since a practitioner is required under Rule 21 to "perform,
except in an emergency, only a professional act (a) for which he or she is adequately educated, trained
and sufficiently experienced; or (b) under improper conditions and in appropriate surroundings," id.
R. 21, conduct in contravention of Rule 21 will be regarded as unethical conduct that should be reported
to the professional board.
38. Id. R. 25(l)(a).
39. Id. R. 25(1)(b).
40. Id. R. 1.
41. Strauss, supra note 1, at 59.
42. CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 283.
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1. Contract43
A patient who consults a doctor in private practice enters into a con-
tractual relationship with the doctor, and a patient who presents for medical
treatment at a hospital enters into a contractual relationship with the rele-
vant (private or provincial) hospital authority. In the latter instance, both
the hospital authority and the staff of the hospital (including the doctors)
may incur liability for the negligent conduct of the hospital employees.44
No legal formalities are required for the conclusion of the contract be-
tween doctor or hospital and patient. The contract comes into being by
mere consensus between the parties,4 5 but, in practice, both private and
state hospitals usually require their patients to sign an admission form and
require written consent for surgery. The contract may be concluded ex-
pressly or tacitly, and may be written or oral.46 Doctors in private practice
normally enter into tacit agreements with their patients.47
Express agreements between doctor or hospital and patient are not un-
usual, especially in cases of specialised procedures. Where no express
agreement has been reached, the implied terms of the contract between the
parties will depend upon the specific circumstances of the case. 48 Usually,
the implied agreement between doctor and patient entails that the doctor
undertakes to examine the patient, to diagnose his or her ailment, and to
treat the patient with such professional skill, competence, and judgment as
the average or ordinary medical practitioner in the particular branch of the
profession possesses, and with the amount of care that may reasonably be
expected from such a practitioner.49 The doctor ordinarily undertakes to act
in accordance with the recognised, accepted, customary, or usual practices
of medicine. 50 Any unusual procedures contemplated by the medical practi-
tioner should first be discussed with the patient.
43. See generally CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 283-88; N.J.B. CLAASSEN & T.
VERSCHOOR, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 115-18 (1992); INTRODUCTION TO MEDICO-
LEGAL PRACTICE 5 (Mahomed A. Dada & David J. McQuoid-Mason eds., 2001); Strauss, supra note 1,
at 59-64; S.A. STRAUSS & M.J. STRYDOM, DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE GENEESKUNDIGE REG [THE SOUTH
AFRICAN MEDICAL LAW] 104 (1967).
44. INTRODUCTION TO MEDICO-LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, at 5.
45. CLAASSEN & VERSCHOOR, supra note 43, at 115.
46. Strauss, supra note 1, at 60.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id (citing Van Wyk v. Lewis 1924 AD 438 at 448, 469-70; Allot v. Paterson & Jackson 1936
SR 221 at 224; cf Collins v. Adm'r, Cape 1995 (4) SA 73 (C) at 81-82; Coppen v. Impey 1916 CPD
309 at 314; Kovalsky v. Krige (1910) 20 CTR 822 at 823; Buls v. Tsatsarolakis 1976 (2) SA 891 (T) at
893; Clinton-Parker v. Adm'r, Transvaal 1996 (2) SA 37 (W) at 56, 58; Applicant v. Adm'r, Transvaal
1993 (4) SA 733 (W) at 738.) Diagnosis and treatment are not always involved, as the contract may also
2011] 1269
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Ordinarily, by taking on a case, a doctor or hospital does not guarantee
that the patient will be cured or that the intervention will be a success; of
course, the possibility of an express or implied warranty to that effect does
exist.51 In the normal course of events, the doctor undertakes no more than
to treat or operate upon the patient with due competence, care, and skill-
namely, that which may be expected from a medical practitioner in the
particular branch of the profession.52
A doctor or hospital that fails to perform in accordance with, or that
departs or deviates from, the express or implied terms of the contract,
commits a breach of contract.53 Since medical practitioners are expected to
exercise reasonable skill and care, it will amount to breach of contract for a
medical practitioner to perform his or her duties in a negligent manner.54
Breach of contract may result in the doctor or hospital being held li-
able for patrimonial loss, or in the doctor or hospital being unable to re-
cover a fee for services rendered.55 However, non-pecuniary (non-
patrimonial) damages cannot be recovered in contract.56 Specific perform-
ance is not a likely remedy, since the doctor renders a personal service to
the patient.57
The medical practitioner cannot unilaterally withdraw from the
agreement once treatment has commenced.58 Once the treatment has been
completed, the agreement comes to an end and the doctor can no longer be
involve medical examinations for non-therapeutic interventions (such as cosmetic surgery, experimenta-
tion, or prophylactic measures) or medical examinations for other purposes such as employment. Id. at
61 n.2.
51. Strauss, supra note 1, at 61 (citing Van Wyk 1924 AD at 456; Coppen 1916 CPD at 314;
Kovalsky 20 CTR at 823; Verhoef v. Meyer 1975 (T), 1976 (A) (unreported); Chalk v. Fassler 1995 (W)
(unreported); Behrmann v. Klugman 1988 (W) (unreported); cf Buls 1976 (2) SA at 893 (question
raised but not answered)); see also SYBRAND A. STRAUSS, DOCTOR, PATIENT AND THE LAW: A
SELECTION OF PRACTICAL ISSUES 35-36, 41, 176-77 (1991).
52. Id.; see also INTRODUCTION TO MEDICO-LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, at 5, 22; STRAUSS,
supra note 51, at 41.
53. Strauss, supra note 1, at 62. Examples of such conduct would include where a doctor other
than the one agreed upon performs the medical intervention, or where the medical intervention differs
from the one agreed upon. Id at 62 n.2 (citing STRAUSS & STRYDOM, supra note 43, at 107; Burger v.
Adm'r, Kaap 1990 (1) SA 483 (C), Recsei's Estate v. Meine 1943 EDL 277).
54. CLAASSEN & VERSCHOOR, supra note 43, at 116.
55. Strauss, supra note 1, at 62 (citing Recsei's Estate 1943 EDL 277; McCallum v. Hallen 1916
EDL 74; Sutherlandv. White 1911 EDL 407; Hewatt v. Rendel 1925 TPD 679; cf Oates v. Niland 1914
CPD 976; Kruger v. Boltman 1933 (1) PH A 3 (E); Shiels v. Minister ofHealth 1974 (3) SA 276 (RA)).
56. Id. (citing Adm'r, Natal v. Edouard 1990 (3) SA 581 (A) at 590, 593; Edouard v. Adm'r, Natal
1989 (2) SA 368 (D) at 385; cf Jansen van Vuuren v. Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A) at 848-49).
57. See Myers v. Abramson 1952 (3) SA 121 (C) at 124.
58. CLAASSEN & VERSCHOOR, supra note 43, at 117. Note, however, that in terms of section 20 of
the National Health Act, a "health care provider may refuse to treat a [patient or client] who is physi-
cally or verbally abusive or who sexually harasses him or her." National Health Act 61 of 2003 § 20(4).
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expected to attend to the patient. 59 An undertaking on the part of a doctor to
examine a patient and to diagnose his or her condition does not amount to
an undertaking on the part of the doctor to personally treat the patient.60 A
doctor may refer the patient to another doctor for treatment without fear of
being held liable for breach of contract. 61 In fact, a failure to refer a patient
to a specialist when the doctor lacks the necessary knowledge or skill to
treat the patient may amount to negligence. 62
2. Delict (Tort)63
In terms of the law of delict, doctors and hospitals are expected to ex-
ercise reasonable care to prevent harm from occurring to their patients. 64
Should a patient suffer damage or loss as a result of a doctor or hospital's
wrongful failure to take reasonable care, the doctor or hospital may incur
liability for negligence. 65 A doctor or hospital that intentionally violates the
patient's physical integrity may be held liable for assault, whilst a doctor or
hospital that intentionally violates the patient's privacy may incur liability
for injuria.66
The State Liability Act makes provision for delictual liability of the
state.67 Vicarious liability of the state is recognised in that a delictual claim
against the state shall be cognisable by a court of law if the claim arises out
of any wrong committed by any servant of the state acting in his capacity
and within the scope of his authority as such.68 Both patrimonial loss and
non-pecuniary damages are recoverable in delict. 69
59. Strauss, supra note 1, at 63 (citing Kovalsky v. Krige (1910) 20 CTR 822 at 822); CLAASSEN
& VERSCHOOR, supra note 43, at 117.
60. CLAASSEN & VERSCHOOR, supra note 43, at 117.
61. Id.
62. Id; INTRODUCTION TO MEDICO-LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, at 5.
63. See generally CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 489; CLAASSEN & VERSCHOOR, supra
note 43, at 118-24; INTRODUCTION TO MEDICO-LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, at 22; Strauss, supra
note 1, at 64-65; STRAUSS & STRYDOM, supra note 43, at 159.
64. Strauss, supra note 1, at 64-65 (citing Correira v. Berwind 1986 (4) SA 60 (Z) at 66; cf
Michael v. Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd. 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA); Van Wyk v. Lewis 1924 AD 438
at 443-44,455-56; Collins v. Adm'r, Cape 1995 (4) SA 73 (C) at 81).
65. Id at 64.
66. Id. at 64-65.
67. State Liability Act 20 of 1957 § 1.
68. Id.
69. Strauss, supra note 1, at 63 (citing Adm'r, Natal v. Edouard 1990 (3) SA 581 (A) at 590, 595;
Edouard v. Adm'r, Natal 1989 (2) SA 368 (D) at 389; Clinton-Parker v. Adm'r, Transvaal 1996 (2) SA
37 (W); cf Jansen van Vuuren v. Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A) 848-49; Collins v. Adm'r, Cape 1995 (4)
SA 73 (C) at 83; Pringle v. Adm'r, Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W)).
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3. Criminal Law70
The relationship between doctor or hospital and patient is not gov-
erned directly by criminal law. However, there are various common-law
crimes that the doctor may conceivably commit in the course of practising
medicine, including murder,7 1 culpable homicide, 72 assault, 73 criminal
defamation, 74 crimen iniuria,75 fraud, 76 perjury, 77 and contempt of court.78
Culpable homicide-which in South African law is defined as the negligent
and unlawful causing of the death of another human being79-is by far the
most relevant of these. In South African law, the conduct of a doctor who
intentionally contributes to, or causes the death of, a patient, amounts to
murder. Active euthanasia is therefore regarded as murder. 80 Because cul-
pable homicide is the only common-law crime for which the proof of neg-
ligence (as opposed to intention) is sufficient, it is the only common-law
crime for which a professionally negligent practitioner can be held liable.81
In South African case law, conviction of culpable homicide resulted, for
instance, from a negligent over-prescription of medicine, 82 a blood transfu-
sion performed on the wrong patient,83 an excessive amount of contrast
70. See generally CLAASSEN & VERSCHOOR, supra note 43, at 127-28; Strauss, supra note 1, at
65; STRAUSS & STRYDOM, supra note 43, at 338.
71. C.R. SNYMAN, CRIMINAL LAW 447 (5th ed. 2008) ("Murder is the unlawful and intentional
causing of the death of another human being.").
72. Id. at 451 ("Culpable homicide is the unlawful, negligent causing of the death of another
human being.").
73. Id at 455 ("Assault consists in any unlawful and intentional act or omission (a) which results
in another person's bodily integrity being directly or indirectly impaired, or (b) which inspires a belief
in another person that such impairment of her bodily integrity is immediately to take place.").
74. Id. at 475 ("Criminal defamation consists in the unlawful and intentional publication of matter
concerning another which tends seriously to injure his reputation.").
75. Id. at 469 ("Crimen iniuria consists in the unlawful, intentional and serious violation of the
dignity or privacy of another.").
76. Id. at 531 ("Fraud is the unlawful and intentional making of a misrepresentation which causes
actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another.").
77. Id at 343 ("Perjury consists in the unlawful and intentional making of a false statement in the
course of a judicial proceeding by a person who has taken the oath or made an affirmation before, or
who has been admonished by, somebody competent to administer or accept the oath, affirmation or
admonition.").
78. Id. at 325 ("Contempt of court consists in unlawfully and intentionally (a) violating the dig-
nity, repute or authority of a judicial body or a judicial officer in his judicial capacity; or (b) publishing
information or comment concerning a pending judicial proceeding which has the tendency to influence
the outcome of the proceeding or to interfere with the administration of justice in that proceeding.").
79. Id. at 451.
80. S v. Hartmann 1975 (3) SA 532 (C).
81. Ferdinand F.W. van Oosten, Professional Medical Negligence in Southern African Legal
Practice, 5 MED. & L. 17, 22 (1986).
82. See, e.g., R v. Van Schoor 1948 (4) SA 349 (C); S v. Mkwetshana 1965 (2) SA 493 (N); R v.
Van der Merwe 1953 (2) PH H124 (W).
83. S v. Berman 1996 (T) (unreported).
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medium administered to a baby, 84 failure to insert an endotracheal tube
correctly and to monitor the patient properly during anaesthesia,85 and fail-
ure by a general practitioner to call in a specialist obstetrician when com-
plications set in during delivery. 86
Statutory crimes that may be perpetrated by a doctor in the course of
practising medicine include those created under the Inquests Act,87 the
Human Tissue Act,8 8 the Births and Deaths Registration Act,89 the Choice
on Termination of Pregnancy Act,90 the Sterilisation Act,91 the Mental
Health Care Act,92 the National Health Act,93 and the Children's Act. 94
4. Relationship Between the Liability Systems
The relationship between doctor or hospital and patient is ordinarily of
a contractual nature.95 Where no contract is formed between the parties, 96
the relationship between them is governed by the law of delict. 97 However,
the same act or omission by a doctor or hospital may result in both contrac-
tual and delictual liability since a breach of a duty of care and negligence
may constitute both breach of contract and a delict.98
A breach of contract or the commission of a delict by a doctor may, in
addition, result in criminal liability where the doctor's wrongful conduct
84. S.A. Strauss, Oormatige Toediening van Kontrasmiddel: Strafbare Manslag [Excessive Ad-
ministration of Contrast Medium: Culpable Homicide], 8 (1) S. AFR. PRAC. MGMT. 27 (1987) (citing S
v. Bezuidenhout 1985 (A) (unreported)).
85. S v. Kramer & Another 1987 (1) SA 887 (W).
86. S.A. Strauss, Versuim van Geneesheer om Spesialis-Verloskundige by Probleem-Bevalling in
te Roep, Stel Nalatigheid Daar [Failure of General Practitioner to Call in Specialist Obstetrician in
Case of Complicated Delivery Constitutes Negligence], 9 (1) S. AFR. PRAC. MGMT. 7 (1988) (citing S v.
Nel 1987 (T) (unreported)).
87. Inquests Act 58 of 1959 § 20.
88. Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 § 34.
89. Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 § 31.
90. Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 § 10.
91. Sterilisation Act 44 of 1998 § 9.
92. Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002 § 70.
93. National Health Act 61 of 2003 §§ 57(5), 89.
94. Children's Act 38 of 2005 § 305.
95. Strauss, supra note 1, at 59.
96. Id. at 59 n.2 (providing the example of an emergency where urgent, life-saving treatment is
performed on an unconscious patient) (citing Stoffberg v. Elliott 1923 CPD 148 at 150).
97. Id. at 59. It is still being debated whether a so-called "constitutional delict" exists in our law.
See CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 556-67; Strauss, supra note 1, at 59 n.3; Deborah Louise
Pearmain, A Critical Analysis of the Law of Health Service Delivery in South Africa 825-37 (Nov.
2004) (unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria).
98. Strauss, supra note 1, at 59 (citing Van Wyk v. Lewis 1924 AD 438 at 438, 443, 450-51, 455-
56; Adm'r, Natal v. Edouard 1990 (3) SA 581 (A) at 585; Castell v. De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) at
420, 425; Edouard v. Adm'r, Natal 1989 (2) SA 368 (D) at 389; Correira v. Berwind 1986 (4) SA 60
(Z) at 63, 66).
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satisfies the requirements of the definition of a common-law crime. 99
Common-law crimes that may overlap with a breach of contract or the
commission of a delict by the doctor include murder, culpable homicide,
assault, criminal defamation, crimen injuria, and fraud. 100
C. Compensation Systems
No social insurance system for medical malpractice or adverse medi-
cal events exists in South Africa. There is also no compensation scheme for
criminally caused injuries. Those wishing to recover from private practitio-
ners or institutions have no alternative but to institute proceedings either in
contract or delict in a court of law. Most of these cases will be settled out of
court. 101
Those wishing to recover from a state institution, whether in contract
or delict, can do so in terms of the State Liability Act. 102 This might be
more difficult than one would imagine. In Nyathi v. MEC for Department
of Health, Gauteng,103 the applicant sought confirmation by the Constitu-
tional Court' 04 of a declaration by the High Court that the provisions in
section 3 of the State Liability Act that "[n]o execution, attachment or like
process shall be issued against a defendant or respondent in any such action
or proceedings or against the property of the State" 0 5 was unconstitutional
and invalid.106 The salient facts of this case are indeed very disconcerting.
On August 1, 2002, "the applicant suffered 30% second- and third-degree
bum wounds after a paraffin stove was thrown at him."107 He was admitted
to the Pretoria Academic Hospital for treatment on the same day. 08 "[A]
central venous line was incorrectly inserted into his right carotis communis
artery." 09 On the next day, he was transferred to Kalafong Hospital where
the medical staff "failed to timeously diagnose the incorrect insertion of the
central venous line.""l0 As a result of the conduct of the medical staff at the
99. Strauss, supra note 1, at 65.
100. Id.; see also supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
101. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
102. State Liability Act 20 of 1957 § 1.
103. 2008 (5) SA 94 (CC).
104. Under section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
105. State Liability Act 20 of 1957 § 3.
106. The constitutional validity of the provision was challenged "on the basis that it violated, inter
alia, the rights to equality and dignity, enshrined in [sections] 9 and 10 of the Constitution [of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996], respectively." Nyathi 2008 (5) SA at 95.
107. Id. at 99.
108. Id
109. Id.
110. Id.
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two hospitals, the applicant suffered a stroke and severe left hemiplegia
which left him in need of full-time care and medical treatment." He "used
to receive a social grant of R570 per month and his wife's total monthly
income was R1600."ll 2 The two of them "had to support their four children
and provide for their daily living expenses."ll 3
On July 25, 2005-almost three years later-the applicant instituted
an action in the High Court against the Member of the Executive Council
for Department of Health (MEC), "claiming damages in the sum of
R1,496,000 for the pain caused by the stroke and disability suffered as a
result of the negligent and improper care he received at the two hospi-
tals.""14 After initially resisting the applicant's claim, the MEC later admit-
ted liability.115 "The only remaining issue was the amount payable to the
applicant."1 16 More than a year later, on July 27, 2006, "the applicant's
attorneys wrote to the State Attorney stating that the applicant's health was
deteriorating rapidly," that he "urgently required treatment and medica-
tion," and that he "could not afford to pay the necessary medical and legal
costs while the hearing scheduled for [May 23, 2007,] was pending.""17
They requested that an interim payment of R317,700 be made within four-
teen days, failing which they would approach the court for relief.118 On
August 3, 2006, the State Attorney reported that it had referred the matter
to the MEC and that the MEC had asked for one week within which to
pay. 119 Twenty days later, the State Attorney advised the applicant's attor-
neys that the MEC was taking issue with paying the requested amount as an
interim payment instead of a final payment.120 The MEC "requested that
payment be deferred until the trial court had decided the issue of costs."' 21
"In September 2006, having received no further response from the
[MEC], the applicant lodged an application in terms of Uniform Rule
34A," which provides for an application for an interim payment, 122 "and
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 100.
120. Id
121. Id.
122. UNIFORM RULES OF COURT, R. 34A(1) ("In an action for damages for personal injuries or the
death of a person, the plaintiff may, at any time after the expiry of the period for the delivery of the
notice of intention to defend, apply to the court for an order requiring the defendant to make an interim
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served it on the State Attorney during October 2006."123 "The matter was
unopposed and the court ordered the [MEC] to make an interim payment to
the applicant in the amount of 317,700 and to pay the applicant's costs on
the attorney and client scale."l 24 On December 1, 2006, "[t]he applicant,
having received no payment, sent a copy of the court order together with a
letter to the State Attorney," stating "that should the first respondent fail to
comply with the court order within the prescribed 30-day period, the appli-
cant's attorneys would proceed with an application to compel him to do
so."1 25 The MEC failed to comply with the court order.126
The Constitutional Court confirmed the order of constitutional invalid-
ity of the court a quo and suspended the declaration of invalidity for a pe-
riod of twelve months to enable Parliament to pass legislation providing for
the effective enforcement of court orders. 127 The court held that section 3
unjustifiably differentiated between the state and private judgment deb-
tors. 128 It did not afford a judgment creditor who had secured judgment
against the state the same protection and benefit afforded to a judgment
creditor who had secured judgment against a private litigant. 129 Further-
more, section 3 placed the state above the law, as it did not positively ob-
lige the state to comply with court orders.130 The Court further held that
section 3 violated the constitutional rights to dignityl3' and access to
courts. 132 Having found that the limitation imposed on these rights by sec-
tion 3 was not reasonable and justifiable as intended in the Constitution's
limitation clause, 133 the court proceeded to assess the effectiveness of the
existing procedures to secure the satisfaction of judgment debts, which it
considered essential in determining whether section 3 was constitutionally
compliant.134 The existing provisions designed to assist judgment creditors
in claiming from the National Revenue Fund and the Provincial Revenue
payment in respect of his claim for medical costs and loss of income arising from his physical disability
or the death of a person.").
123. Nyathi 2008 (5) SA at 100.
124. Id.
125. Id
126. Id.
127. Id. at 123.
128. Id. at 109.
129. Id. at 107.
130. Id. This was held to be incompatible with the plain language of sections 8, 34, 165(4), and
165(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Id.
131. Id. (citing S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 10)).
132. Id (citing S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 34)).
133. Id. at 110 (citing S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 36(1)).
134. Id. at Ill .
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Fundl 35 did not contain sufficiently accessible and simple procedures for
the payment of judgment debts. Therefore, they did not constitute a reason-
able fulfillment of the state's constitutional obligations and failed to deal
with how court orders were to be satisfied.' 36
In his judgment, Justice Madala (for the majority) remarked that "de-
liberate non-compliance with or disobedience of a court order by the State
detracts from the 'dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts."'1 37
He also pointed out that "[t]he applicant was made to wait for an extremely
long time for money required to pay for his treatment" without which "he
stood a very slim chance of survival." 38 Although "[t]he State was made
fully aware of this very desperate situation, [it] provided no relief," which
showed a lack of "recognition for his worth and importance as a human
being."l 39 "Having waited for many months, the applicant eventually re-
ceived interim payment" once he approached the Constitutional Court, but
he "only lived a short while thereafter." 40 Justice Madala added that
"[r]eliance on the State's goodwill and moral standards has in this case
proved to be futile."14 1
In his review of the response of our courts to section 3, Justice Madala
made the following pronouncements:
An assessment of the cases that have dealt with the Act and the li-
ability of the State for its negligent actions have revealed that courts have
been facing immense challenges in this area of the law. The various High
Courts have approached the matter very differently and with disparate
consequences. However, the common denominator is that judicial offi-
cers have recognised that there is a serious problem caused by the fact
that a judgment creditor who obtains an order sounding in money, may
find that order unenforceable against the State.
In more recent years, and in particular the period from 2002 on-
wards, courts have been inundated with situations where court orders
have been flouted by State functionaries, who, on being handed such
court orders, have given very flimsy excuses which in the end only point
to their dilatoriness. The public officials seem not to understand the inte-
gral role that they play in our constitutional State, as the right of access
135. Id at 112. The provisions are contained in the Public Finance Management Act I of 1999 and
the attendant Treasury Regulations. See GN R225 in GG27388 of 15 Mar. 2005.
136. Nyathi 2008 (5) SA at 113.
137. Id. at 108.
138. Id. at 109.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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to courts entails a duty not only on the courts to ensure access but on the
State to bring about the enforceability of court orders. 142
He expressed his dissatisfaction with the conduct and attitude of certain
state officials in no uncertain terms:
In my view there can be no greater carelessness, dilatoriness or negli-
gence than to ignore a court order sounding in money, even more so
when the matter emanates from a destitute person who has no means of
pursuing his or her claim in a court of law. But we now have some offi-
cials who have become a law unto themselves and openly violate peo-
ple's rights in a manner that shows disdain for the law, in the belief that
as State officials they cannot be held responsible for their actions or inac-
tion. Courts have had to spend too much time in trying to ensure that
court orders are enforceable against the State precisely because a
straightforward procedure is not available. 143
1. Sufficient Insurance Cover To Be Required for Private Health
Establishments
Once section 46 of the National Health Act comes into operation, it
will require every private health establishment to maintain insurance cover
sufficient to indemnify a user for damages that he or she might suffer as a
consequence of a wrongful act by any member of its staff or by any of its
employees.1 44 In the terminology of the Act, "user" means a patient or
certain other parties such as a minor patient's parent, or in the case of a
person who is incapable of taking decisions, his or her spouse or partner,
adult siblings, and other specified persons. 145 "Health establishment" is
defined in the Act as "the whole or part of a public or private institution,
facility, building or place, whether for profit or not, that is operated or de-
signed to provide inpatient or outpatient treatment, diagnostic or therapeu-
tic interventions, nursing, rehabilitative, palliative, convalescent,
preventative or other health services."1 46 This definition is drafted in such
wide terms that it includes also the practice of private practitioners. Al-
though most private hospital networks do have professional indemnity
insurance, once section 46 of the Act comes into operation, it will become
mandatory, and failure to comply will hold the risk of criminal sanction.
Hospitals will therefore be responsible for maintaining sufficient insurance
cover for staff, such as nurses, whereas medical practitioners attending to
142. Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
143. Id at 114.
144. National Health Act 61 of 2003 § 46.
145. Id § 1.
146. Id
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patients at the hospital will be responsible for their own insurance cover as
they are independent contractors.
2. Private Indemnity (Medical Protection Society)
More than 26,000 medical practitioners in South Africa belong to the
Medical Protection Society (MPS).147 The organisation has been in South
Africa for over fifty years.148 There are various differences between the
medical indemnity offered by an organisation such as the MPS, and that
offered by commercial insurers: 149 The MPS is a not-for-profit mutual
organisation offering discretionary indemnity to their members (even in
unusual circumstances). 5 0 The MPS offers unlimited cover for legal prob-
lems arising from medical practice,151 whereas commercial insurers will
usually provide limited cover only. The MPS will not deny cover in respect
of activities involving a contravention of the provisions of criminal law, 152
whereas the fine print of a commercial insurance policy may do just that.
The MPS provides cover even where the medical practitioner's member-
ship has lapsed, provided the membership dues were paid up at the time of
the incidence which led to the claim,153 whereas commercial insurers may
make cover conditional upon the policy still being valid at the time the
medical practitioner issued. The MPS further provides legal advice and
representation to members in a wide range of circumstances, including
legal representation and advice from specialists in the field of medical liti-
gation, and assist member to resolve specific ethical and medico-legal di-
lemmas as they arise in their practice.154
147. About MPS, MEDICAL PROTECTION SOCIETY, http://www.medicalprotection.org/southafrical
guide/about-mps (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). MPS also claims to have over 270,000 members world-
wide. Id.
148. Id.
149. STRAUSS, supra note 51, at 247-48; About MPS, MEDICAL PROTECTION SOCIETY,
http://www.medicalprotection.org/southafrica/guide/about-mps (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
150. About MPS, supra note 149.
151. MPS Indemnity, MEDICAL PROTECTION SOCIETY, http://www.medicalprotection.org/
southafrica/guide/mps-indemnity (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
152. Unusual Requests for Assistance, MEDICAL PROTECTION SOCIETY,
http://www.medicalprotection.org/southafrica/guide/unusual-requests-for-assistance (last visited Nov.
4, 2010). Importantly, medical negligence resulting in the death of a patient would constitute the crime
of culpable homicide. In the section on criminal law, a number of offences that doctors may commit in
the course of practising medicine have been mentioned. See supra Part I.B.3.
153. MPS Indemnity, supra note 151.
154. Benefits of Membership, MEDICAL PROTECTION SOCIETY, http://www.medicalprotection.org/
southafrica/guide/benefits-of-membership (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
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D. Relationships Among the Compensation Systems, the Liability
Systems, and the Regulatory Systems
The Inquests Act provides for all matters pertaining to the holding of
an inquest following the death (or suspected death) of a person from what
is believed to be a cause other than a natural one. 155 In the medical mal-
practice context, the Act plays an important role in the initiation of criminal
proceedings for culpable homicide or murder against a medical practitioner
who has caused the death of a patient in a negligent or intentional manner.
The Inquests Act provides that any person who has reason to believe that
any other person has died due to other than natural causes must report this
to a policeman.156 The Health Professions Act provides that the death of a
person undergoing a therapeutic, diagnostic, or palliative procedure, or the
death of a person as a result of such a procedure, shall not be deemed to be
a death from natural causes as contemplated in the Inquests Act. 157 The
same applies if any aspect of such a procedure has been a contributory
cause of the person's death.158 The effect of this provision is that an inquest
must be held following such a death before a death certificate can be is-
sued. A policeman who has reason to believe that any person has died from
other than natural causes must investigate or cause to be investigated the
circumstances of the death and report the death to the magistrate of the
district concerned.159 The policeman investigating the circumstances of the
death must submit a report thereon, together with all relevant statements,
documents, and information, to the public prosecutor. 160 If Criminal pro-
ceedings are not instituted in connection with the death, the public prosecu-
tor must submit those statements, documents, and information submitted to
him to the magistrate of the district concerned.161 If on the information
submitted to him it appears to the magistrate that the death was not due to
natural causes, he must ensure that an inquest as to the circumstances and
cause of the death is held by a judicial officer.162 Importantly, if the judicial
155. Inquests Act 58 of 1959 § 2(1).
156. Id. § 2. In view of the focus of this enquiry, no attempt shall be made to set out the relevant
sections of the Inquests Act in detail. The provisions of the Act that may have a bearing on inquests to
be held following an unnatural death at the hands of a medical practitioner will be set out and only to
the extent strictly relevant to the present study.
157. Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 § 56.
158. Id.
159. Inquests Act § 3(l)(ab).
160. Id. § 4. The public prosecutor may, if he deems it necessary, call for any additional informa-
tion regarding the death. Id
161. Id. § 5(1).
162. Id. § 5(2). The judicial officer responsible for holding such an inquest is stipulated in sec-
tion 6. Id. § 6.
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officer who held the inquest finds that the death was brought about by any
act or omission prima facie involving or amounting to an offence on the
part of any person, he must cause the record of the proceedings to be sub-
mitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions within whose area of jurisdic-
tion the inquest was held.163 When the record of any inquest that has been
submitted 64 to an Director of Public Prosecutions is no longer required by
such Director of Public Prosecutions, it must be returned to the magistrate
of the district in which the inquest was held.165 In terms of section 19(2) of
the Inquests Act, such record is deemed to form part of the records of the
magistrate's court of the district wherein the inquest was held.166 The pro-
visions of the Inquests Act do not prevent the institution of criminal pro-
ceedings against any person in connection with any death, whether or not
an inquest has commenced in respect of such death.167
Where a registered practitioner has, either before or after registration,
been convicted of any offence by a court of law, the professional board is
empowered to institute an inquiry if it is of the opinion that such offence
constitutes unprofessional conduct.168 Such practitioner is liable upon con-
viction of one or other of the penalties mentioned in section 42 of the
Health Professions Act. 169 In terms of section 45(1), however, before the
imposition of any penalty, such practitioner must be afforded the opportu-
nity of tendering an explanation to the council in extenuation of the con-
duct in question.170 The court that has convicted a registered practitioner of
an offence must, where there appears to be prima facie proof of unprofes-
sional conduct, direct that a copy of the record of its proceedings be trans-
mitted to the professional board.171
In Suid-Afrikaanse Geneeskundige & Tandheelkundige Raad v.
Strauss, it was held that, notwithstanding the use of the words "before the
imposition of any penalty" in the proviso of section 45(1), the accused
doctor should, after proof of his or her conviction in a court of law, be af-
forded the opportunity to put his or her defence to the charge of unprofes-
sional conduct.172 The court reasoned that "a strictly literal interpretation of
163. Id. § 17(1)(b).
164. Id. § 17.
165. Id. § 19(1).
166. Id. § 19(2).
167. Id. § 21(1).
168. Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 § 45(1).
169. Id
170. Id.
171. Id. § 45(2).
172. 1991 (3) SA 203 (A) at 212.
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section 45(1) would lead to a disciplinary inquiry being eroded to the point
where it amounted to a farce wherein the disciplinary committee merely
fulfilled the function of a rubber stamp," which would offend the principles
of natural justice and fairness and would be "diametrically opposed to and
incompatible with the obvious intention of the Legislature." 73
The obligation to direct that a copy of the record of its proceedings be
transmitted to the relevant professional board is not restricted to a court that
has convicted a registered practitioner of an offence. In fact, "[w]henever in
the course of any proceedings before any court of law it appears to the
court that there is prima facie proof of unprofessional conduct on the part
of a registered person," or of conduct which, when regard is had to such
person's profession, is unprofessional, the court is bound to "direct that a
copy of the record of such proceedings, or such portion thereof as is ma-
terial to the issue, be transmitted to the [relevant] professional board."' 74 It
appears, therefore, that any civil and criminal proceeding is covered.
II. THE DETAILS OF THE APPLICABLE LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
SYSTEMS
A. Criteria Defining Qualification for Compensation
1. Liability Based on Fault
In South Africa, liability for professional medical negligence, in its
civil law context, is primarily rooted in the Law of Obligations (translating
into the Law of Contract and the Law of Delict (Tort)). As a result, it is
trite law that all compensation for medical negligence (inclusive of medical
error and any adverse event) is based on fault (in the form of culpa). Thus,
generally speaking, a physician's negligence is legally assessed with refer-
ence to the yardstick of the "reasonable expert in the same circumstances."
In any given context, negligence means that the defendant or the accused
failed to foresee the possibility of harm (bodily or mental injury or death)
occurring to another in circumstances where the reasonable person (dili-
gens paterfamilias) in the defendant's or accused's position would have
foreseen the possibility of harm occurring to another and would have taken
steps to avoid or prevent it. The generic test for negligence is thus one of
foreseeability and preventability. 175 Although the test for negligence is
fundamentally objective, it does contain subjective elements when the neg-
173. Id. at 205.
174. Health Professions Act § 45(2).
175. See generally CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, ch. 9.
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ligence of an expert is assessed. "Where the defendant or the accused is an
expert, the standard of negligence is upgraded from the reasonable layper-
son to the reasonable expert. Where the expert is a [medical practitioner],
the standard is that of the reasonable [medical practitioner] in the same
circumstances."1 76
The test for medical negligence was enunciated in the case of Mitchell
v. Dixon,177 where Acting Chief Justice Innes observed, "A medical practi-
tioner is not expected to bring to bear upon the case entrusted to him the
highest possible degree of professional skill and care, he is bound to em-
ploy reasonable skill and care; and he is liable for the consequences if he
does not."178
In Van Wyk v. Lewis,179 reference is made to "the general level of skill
and diligence possessed and exercised at the time by the members of the
branch of the profession to which the practitioner belongs." 80 What is
required, however, is not the highest possible degree of professional care
and skill, but reasonable knowledge, ability, experience, care, skill, and
diligence.' 8 ' Van Oosten correctly states that the standard that is required:
[I]s thus based not on what can be expected of the exceptionally able
doctor, but on what can be expected of the ordinary or average doctor in
view of the general level of knowledge, ability, experience, skill and di-
ligence possessed and exercised by the profession, bearing in mind that a
176. Ferdinand F.W. van Oosten, South Africa, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS 81-
82 (R. Blanpain ed., 1996); see also CLAASSEN & VERSCHOOR, supra note 43, at 13-26;
INTRODUCTION TO MEDICO-LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, at 22; STRAUSS, supra note 51, at 243;
F.F.W. van Oosten & S.A. Strauss, Legal Liability, in CLINICAL FORENSIC MEDICINE AND MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE 40 (P.A. Carstens & P.W.W. Coetzer eds., 2002); P.A. Carstens, Die Strafregtelike en
Deliktuele Aanspreeklikheid van die Geneesheer op grond van Nalatigheid [The Criminal and Delictual
Liability of the Doctor for Negligence] 144 (2006) (unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria);
Blyth v. Van den Heever 1980 (1) SA 191 (A) at 221; Magware v. Minister of Health 1981 (4) SA 472
(Z) at 476-77; cf CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 619.
177. 1914 AD 519.
178. Id. at 525; see also Coppen v. Impey 1916 CPD 309 at 314; Kovalsky v. Krige (1910) 20 CTR
822 at 823.
179. Van Wyk v. Lewis 1924 AD 438 at 438.
180. Id. at 444.
181. Id. at 470-71; Mitchell v. Dixon 1914 AD 519 at 525; Blyth 1980 (1) SA at 221; Lee v.
Schonnberg (1877) 7 Buch 136; Collins v. Adm'r, Cape 1995 (4) SA 73 (C) at 81; Castell v. De Greef
1993 (3) SA 501 (C) at 509; R v. Van Schoor 1948 (4) SA 349 (C) at 350, 352; Coppen 1916 CPD at
314; Kovalsky 20 CTR at 823; R v. Van der Merwe 1950 (4) SA 124 (0); Allott v. Paterson & Jackson
1936 SR 221 at 224; Buls v. Tsatsarolakis 1976 (2) SA 891 (T) at 893; Esterhuizen v. Administrator
Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T) at 723-24; Pringle v. Adm'r, Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W); S v.
Kramer, 1987 (1) SA 887 (W) at 893; Dube v. Adm'r, Transvaal 1963 (4) SA 260 (W) at 266; Dale v.
Hamilton 1924 WLD 184 at 200; Magware 1981 (4) SA at 476-77; cf Michael v. Linksfield Park
Clinic (Pty) Ltd. 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) at 1192; Ex parte Rautenbach 1938 SR 150 at 151; S v. Van
Almenkerk, 2006 (T) (unreported); Clinton-Parker v. Adm'r, Transvaal 1996 (2) SA 37 (W) at 39-40,
69-70.
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doctor is a human being and not a machine and that no human being is
infallible.182
In essence, "the standard of medical negligence is the recognized and
accepted practices of the medical profession, provided these are not unrea-
sonable and dangerous." 8 3 The test of medical negligence is the same in
civil cases as in criminal cases.184 Medical practice is affected by many
statutory provisions, as well as the common law, and many actions of a
doctor that may result in civil liability or a disciplinary inquiry may also
involve a contravention of criminal law. A prime example is medical negli-
gence that results in the death of a patient and would constitute the criminal
offence of culpable homicide.
The standard of care and skill, in context of medical negligence, re-
quired of a general practitioner is to be distinguished from the standard of
care and skill required of a medical specialist. Simply stated, if the physi-
cian is a general medical practitioner, the test is that of the reasonable gen-
eral practitioner.18 5 If the physician is a specialist, the test is that of the
reasonable specialist with reference to the specific field of medical specia-
lization.186
2. The Role of the South African Constitution, 1996
The common law pertaining to medical negligence is now subject to
the supremacy of the South African Constitution of 1996. The Constitution,
with its strong socio-economic rights base in terms of which everyone has
access to health care services (including reproductive health carel 87), has
catapulted health care into the public arena.188 Traditionally, South African
medical law focused primarily, although not exclusively, on private health
care emanating from a strongly developed private law application with
182. Van Oosten, supra note 176, at 82 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 83; CLAASSEN & VERSCHOOR, supra note 43, at 22; Van Oosten & Strauss, supra note
176, at 42.
184. Van Schoor 1948 (4) SA 349 (C); Van der Merwe 1950 (4) SA 124 (0); cf Van Oosten, supra
note 81, at 22.
185. STRAUSS & STRYDOM, supra note 43, at 268; Van Oosten, supra note 176, at 83; Van Oosten
& Strauss, supra note 176, at 45; Carstens, supra note 176, at 137.
186. STRAUSS & STRYDOM, supra note 43, at 268; Van Oosten, supra note 176, at 83; Van Oosten
& Strauss, supra note 176, at 45; Carstens, supra note 176, at 137.
187. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 27.
188. See D. Brand, Introduction to Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution, in
Socio-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA I (D. Brand & C.H. Heyns eds., 2005); C. Ngwena & R.
Cook, Rights Concerning Health, in SOClo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 107 (D. Brand &
C.H. Heyns eds., 2005); see also A. CLAPHAM & M. ROBINSON, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 11
(Chair of Political Philosophy of the University of Zurich ed., 2009); 1. CURRIE & J. DE WAAL, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 566 (2005).
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specific reference to the law of contract and delict. Universal access to
health care and the notion of the public good, in context of the values, spi-
rit, and purpose of the Constitution, as well as the reality that the majority
of South African citizens are dependent on public health care, in the ab-
sence of a national health insurance system, have now had the effect that
public health care has, to a certain extent, usurped private health care. This
effect would also influence the understanding and application of the law
pertaining to medical negligence and in some instances calls for a devel-
opment or "reconfiguration" of the common law in step with the provisions
of the Constitution.189
3. Nature of Damages and Compensation
In terms of the Law of Obligations (Contract and Delict) the same
medical negligence (negligent act or omission) may constitute both a
breach of contract and delict. In such a case of concurrence of actions, the
patient-plaintiff can rely on the breach of contract or alternatively on delict.
If he or she establishes both claims, damages should be awarded on the
basis of the most advantageous claim. The patient-plaintiff may rely on
both a breach of contract and delict in the same proceeding. In the case of
such cumulative pleading, it is understood that the patient-plaintiff cannot
recover more than the actual loss he or she has suffered. At the same time,
if both claims are proved, the patient-plaintiff should be awarded damages
on the basis of the cause of action most advantageous to him or her. Only
pecuniary (patrimonial damages) may be recovered in contract, while pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary (non-patrimonial) damages can be recovered in
delict. Recoverable pecuniary damages include medical costs (past as well
as future), loss of income (past and future earnings), maintenance, etc. The
ambit for recoverable non-pecuniary damages include not only compensa-
tion for actual physical pain, but also shock, discomfort and mental suffer-
ing, disfigurement, loss of amenities of life and disability, and loss of
expectation of life-conveniently called loss for "pain and suffering which
embraces all these non-pecuniary misfortunes, past and future." 90 It is
possible to claim for detectable psychiatric injury, provided that there was
actual psychological injury caused by medical negligence and the psycho-
logical harm is significant.191 Pecuniary loss and non-pecuniary loss is
189. In pursuance of section 39(2) of the Constitution. See also Carmichele v. Minister of Safety
and Sec. 2002 (1) SACR 79 (CC); see generally CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, ch. 2.
190. P.Q.R. BOBERG, THE LAW OF DELICT 516 (1984).
191. See Rd Accident Fund v. Sauls 2002 (2) SA 55 (SCA); Barnard v. Santam Ltd. 1999 (1) SA
202 (SCA); Clinton-Parker v. Adm'r, Transvaal 1996 (2) SA 37 (W).
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simply a matter of proof on a preponderance of probabilities and in most
instances the services of actuaries are called in to quantify/calculate the
pecuniary loss suffered by the patient-plaintiff, taking into account the
inflation rate (in terms of loss of future earnings), depreciation, life expec-
tancy, retirement age, etc. The calculation of non-pecuniary damages is
more complex and controversial and in this regard courts are in principle
guided by policy considerations and comparable precedent.192
Patient-plaintiffs usually recover damages jointly and severally in the
event of medical negligence claims against more than one defendant doctor
or hospital, and provision is made in the Apportionment of Damages Act
for instances of contributory negligence. 193 There has also developed a
tendency for defendants (doctors/hospitals) against whom a medical negli-
gence claim was successfully instituted by a patient-plaintiff to institute
action against one another for a re-apportionment of damages in terms of
the Act, 194 specifically if the doctor/hospital-defendants are aggrieved by
the apportionment of damages and the amount awarded to the patient-
plaintiff.
The most powerful deterrent against medical negligence litigation in
South Africa is the risk that the patient-plaintiff runs of an order of costs
being made against him if his case fails. The general rule in our system is
that the loser pays the costs-his own legal costs as well as the taxed costs
of his opponent on the so-called "party and party" scale.195 The cost factor
192. See generally M.M. CORBETT & D.P. HONEY, 6 THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN BODILY AND
FATAL INJURY CASES (2010) (discussing damages awarded in the context of specific injuries to specific
body parts); M.M. CORBETT, J.L. BUCHANAN & J.J. GAUNTLETT, THE QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN
BODILY AND FATAL INJURY CASES (3d ed. 1985).
193. Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 § 1.
194. See id § 2(1); cf Wright v. Medi-Clinic Ltd 2007 (2) All SA 513 (C).
195. In South Africa a so-called "contingency fee" is conditionally allowed since 1999 in terms of
section 2 of the Contingency Fees Act, which reads as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law, a legal practi-
tioner may, if in his or her opinion there are reasonable prospects that his or her client may be
successful in any proceedings, enter into an agreement with such client in which it is agreed-
(a) that the legal practitioner shall not be entitled to any fees for services rendered in re-
spect of such proceedings unless such client is successful in such proceedings to the ex-
tent set out in such agreement;
(b) that the legal practitioner shall be entitled to fees equal to or, subject to subsection
(2), higher than his or her normal fees, set out in such agreement, for any such services
rendered, if such client is successful in such proceedings to the extent set out in such
agreement.
(2) Any fees referred to in subsection (1) (b) which are higher than the normal fees of the le-
gal practitioner concerned (hereinafter referred to as the 'success fee'), shall not exceed such
normal fees by more than 100 per cent: Provided that, in the case of claims sounding in mon-
ey, the total of any such success fee payable by the client to the legal practitioner, shall not
exceed 25 percent of the total amount awarded or any amount obtained by the client in conse-
quence of the proceedings concerned, which amount shall not, for purposes of calculating
such excess, include any costs.
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therefore constitutes a powerful incentive for settlement of cases out of
court, depending on the merit and quantum of the case. Punitive damages
(as known in the United States) are not awarded in cases of medical negli-
gence in South Africa. 196
B. Causation and "Loss of Chance"
1. General Rules on Causation
In Muller v. Mutual and Federal Insurance Co. Ltd., the court ob-
served:
[T]he problem of causation in delict involves two distinct enquiries. The
first is whether the defendant's wrongful act was a cause of the plain-
tiff's loss ("factual causation"); the second is whether the wrongful act is
linked sufficiently closely to the loss for legal liability to ensue ("legal
causation" or remoteness). 197
In Minister ofPolice v. Skosana, the court observed that:
Causation in the law of delict gives rise to two ... distinct problems. The
first is a factual one and relates to the question of whether the negligent
act or omission in question caused or materially contributed to the harm
giving rise to the claim. If it did not, then no legal liability can arise and
caedit quaestio. If it did, then the second problem becomes relevant, viz.
whether the negligent act or omission is linked to the harm sufficiently
closely or directly for legal liability to ensue or whether, as it is said, the
harm is too remote. This is basically a juridical problem in which con-
siderations of legal policy may play a part. 198
Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 § 2. It should, however, be noted that it is a practice rule with the
General Council of the Bar of South Africa, that member advocates are only allowed to enter into
contingency fee agreements with clients claiming for personal injury with prior permission from the Bar
Council.
196. Cf Collins v. Adm'r, Cape 1995 (4) SA 73 (C).
197. 1994 (2) SA 425 (C) at 449F-449G; see also S v. Mokgethi En Andere 1990 (1) SA 32 (A);
Int'l Shipping Co. (Pty) Ltd. v. Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) at 700E-701F; Simon & Co. (Pty) Ltd. v.
Barclays Nat'l Bank Ltd. 1984 (2) SA 888 (A) at 914F-915A; Minister of Police v. Skosana 1977 (1)
SA 31 (A) at 34E-35D.
198. Skosana 1997 (1) SA at 34-35 (citing Silva's Fishing Corp. (Pty) Ltd. v. Maweza 1957 (2) SA
256 (A) at 264; Kakamas Bestuursraad v. Louw 1960 (2) SA 202 (A) at 222). Acting Judge Farlam then
quoted W.L. Prosser, who stated:
A cause is a necessary antecedent: in a very real and practical sense, the term embraces all
things which have so far contributed to the result that without them it would not have oc-
curred. It covers not only positive acts and active physical forces, but also pre-existing pas-
sive conditions which have played a material part in bringing about the event. In particular it
covers the defendant's omissions as well as his acts.
Id. at 35 (quoting W.L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 237 (1971)). The judge then observed:
The test is thus whether but for the negligent act or omission of the defendant the event giving
rise to the harm in question would have occurred. This test is otherwise known as that of the
causa (conditio) sine qua non and I agree with my Brother VILJOEN that generally speaking
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Therefore the test for factual causation is, except in the most unusual
of circumstances, the causa (conditio) sine qua non. The plaintiff must
show that the harm would not have arisen but for the actions or omissions
of the defendant. The courts decide the question of legal causation on the
basis of a number of factors that relate essentially to public policy. The
importance of public policy in the constitutional legal order prevails in
South Africa. Public policy is informed by the values and principles of the
Constitution. Thus decisions as to legal causation must also be informed by
constitutional values and principles.1 99
The potential for convergence of the principles of the law of contract
and of delict is evident from the judgment in Silver v. Premier, Gauteng
Provincial Government, where the court refused to distinguish between the
test for causation in considering the contractual as opposed to the delictual
claim of the patient.200 This is particularly relevant in the context of claims
involving health care services since the facts upon which the claim is
based, whether in contract or in delict, are likely to be the same in many
instances.
(there may be exceptions) no act, condition or omission can be regarded as a cause in fact un-
less it passes this test.
Id. (citing Portwood v. Svamvur, 1970 (4) SA 8 (RA) at 14; Da Silva & Another v. Coutinho, 1971 (3)
SA 123 (A) at 147).
199. Cf CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 509.
200. Silver v. Premier, Gauteng Provincial Gov't 1998 (4) SA 569 (W); see also CARSTENS &
PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 509. On the subject of the sine qua non test the court observed that:
I am aware that the plaintiffs claim is founded in contract and, in the alternative, in delict.
But I see no reason why the sine qua non test should not apply equally to the contractual
claim in cAsu. The loss sustained by the plaintiff is said to have been caused by the breach of
an implied term of an agreement that the hospital through its staff and employees would exer-
cise due care, skill and diligence in providing nursing care. Precisely the same facts are relied
upon as constituting a breach of the implied term as are relied upon as constituting a breach of
the duty of care owed to the plaintiff. It would be anomalous if the same result did not follow
irrespective of the cause of action. Furthermore, although the question of remoteness of dam-
age for breach of contract is approached (in the absence of a contractual stipulation as to the
basis on which compensation is to be made) by determining whether the damage flowed natu-
rally and directly from the defendant's breach or is such a loss as the parties contemplated
might occur as a result of such breach, it must, in my view, follow as a matter of logic that as
a general rule, the test for factual causation would first have to be satisfied. There will, of
course, be exceptions, such as that cited by [P.J.] Visser and [J.M.] Potgieter in Law of Dam-
ages (1993) para 6.3.2 at 80--l:
'(W)here a building contractor X is not able to build because Y, who has to deliver ce-
ment, and Z, who has to supply bricks, both fail to honour their contractual obligations
on the same day and thus cause damage to X (eg he loses profit). According to the condi-
tio sine qua non 'test,' neither Y nor Z has caused damage since, if the breach of contract
of each is notionally eliminated, the damage does not fall away!'
The learned authors express the view that common sense must be employed in such cases-
an approach emphasised by Corbett JA in [Siman & Co. (Pty) Ltd v. Barclays Nat'l Bank
Ltd, 1984 (2) SA 888 (A) at 917, 918A] and employed by Lord Wright in [Yorkshire Dale
Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Minister of War Transport [1942] 2 All ER 6] and by Beadle CJ in
[Portwood v. Svamvur 1970 (4) SA 8 (RA) at 15F-G].
Silver 1998 (4) SA 599 (W) at 574-75.
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2. "Loss of a Chance"
Apart from an excellent monograph written by Van den Heever on the
application of the doctrine of a loss of chance in medical negligence
cases, 201 there is presently no reported judgments on the subject (in context
of medical negligence actions) in South Africa, and the positive law posi-
tion therefore remains uncertain.202 An assessment of the application of the
doctrine of loss of a chance in medical negligence underscores the difficul-
ties often encountered by courts when adjudicating on causation in medical
negligence in the face of multiple causation theories. Although reasons for
and against the application of the doctrine have been persuasively argued
and canvassed, 203 in general it seems as though factors militating against
the application of the doctrine in medical law include the possibility of
opening the floodgates for speculative claims, the idea of "playing god" by
placing a value to human life, and the danger of an increase of the inci-
dence of the practice of defensive medicine. On the other hand, factors or
considerations that substantiate the application of the doctrine in medical
law include the recognition of "a chance" having calculable value, the ero-
sion of a patient-plaintiff's autonomy, considerations of fairness to a pa-
tient-plaintiff who is saddled with a difficult burden of proof, and general
deterrence. 204 Whether South African courts, in context of medical negli-
gence, will be prepared to apply the doctrine of a loss of a chance is doubt-
ful, but at least a moot point, specifically if reliance is placed on
comparable English law. In all probability resistance by the courts to apply
the doctrine will ultimately emanate from policy considerations. 205
201. P. VAN DEN HEEVER, THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF A LOSS OF A CHANCE TO
RECOVER IN MEDICAL LAW (2006).
202. In Oldwage v. Louwrens [2004] 1 All SA 532 (C) at 105-15, the doctrine was referred to, but
not discussed; similarly in McDonald v. Wroe [2006] 3 All SA 565 (C) at para. 37, reference was made
to the Australian case of Chapel v. Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 at para. 17, but no discussion in this
regard was entertained.
203. Cf Helen Reece, Losses of Chances in the Law, 59 MOD. L. REV. 188 (1996); Niels Jansen,
The Idea of Lost Chance, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1999); Marc Stauch, Causation, Risk and
Loss of a Chance in Medical Negligence, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1997); see also VAN DEN
HEEVER, supra note 201, at 78.
204. See VANDEN HEEVER, supra note 201, at 115.
205. See CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 833.
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C. Liability for Failure to Obtain Informed Consent
Van Oosten has extensively discussed the legal liability that may be
incurred for no disclosure of information at all, for insufficient disclosure,
and for excessive disclosure.206 In this regard he states that:
The legal consequences of a medical intervention performed without the
patient's effective consent are that the doctor/hospital may incur liability
for breach of contract,[ 207] civil or criminal assault (a violation of bodily
integrity),[ 208] civil or criminal injuria (a violation of digni-
tas/privacy),[ 209] or negligence,[ 210] as the case may be.211
In addition the medical practitioner or hospital may be unable to recover a
professional fee. 212 Van Oosten and Strauss state that "[t]his applies irre-
spective of whether or not the intervention was administered with due care
and skill and eventually proves to have been beneficial to the patient."213
Van Oosten further opines that the violation perpetrated by a doctor who
performs the wrongful or unlawful operation is one against the patient's
physical integrity or dignity/privacy rather than one against his or her
health.214 This view accords with the applicable provisions of the Constitu-
tion. As proposed elsewhere, the absence of informed consent should be
206. FERNINAND F.W. VAN OOSTEN, THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL LAW 455
(1991); cf INTRODUCTION TO MEDICO-LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 43, at 8; Strauss, supra note 1, at
70.
207. Cf Castell v. De Greef1994 (4) SA 408 (C) at 425.
208. Cf Louwrens v. Oldwage, 2006 (2) SA 161 (SCA) at 174; Broude v. McIntosh 1998 (3) SA 60
(SCA) at 61 (questioning, but not overturning, this construction of assault); Lampert v. Hefer 1955 (2)
SA 507 (A); Castell v. De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501 (C) at 425; S v. Binta 1993 (2) SACR 553 (C) at 561;
Burger v. Adm'r, Kaap 1990 (1) SA 483 (C) at 489 ("Dit is heeltemal duidelik dat dit die regsposisie is
dat as 'n dokter ... sonder toestemming van die pasient opereer dit aanranding is [The legal position is
crystal clear: it amounts to assault if a doctor operates without the patient's consent]"); Richter v. Estate
Hammann 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) at 232; Stof/berg v. Elliot,1923 CPD 148; S v. Kiti 1994 (1) SACR 14
(E) at 18; S v. Sikunyana 1961 (3) SA 549 (E) (stating that a medical practitioner who performs a
dangerous operation with his patient's consent incurs no criminal liability (for assault) if just cause for
the operation exists, for the law does not regard his conduct as improper); Fowlie v. Wilson 1993 (N)
(unreported); Layton & Layton v. Wilcox & Higginson 1944 SR 48; Esterhuizen v. Adm'r, Transvaal
1957 (3) SA 710 (T) at 718; Pop v. Revelas 1999 (W) (unreported); see also Oldwage v. Louwrens
[2004] 1 All SA 532 (C); McDonald v. Wroe [2006] 3 All SA 565 (C) at para. 39 (holding that absence
of consent was a violation of the patient's constitutional right in terms of section 12(2)(b)).
209. See Stoffberg 1923 CPD at 152.
210. Louwrens 2006 (2) SA at 174; Lymbery v. Jefferies 1925 AD 236; Richter v. Estate Hammann,
1976 (3) SA 226 (C) at 232; Prowse v. Kaplan 1933 EDL 257; Allott v. Patterson & Jackson 1936 SR
221 at 221-22, 224; Layton & Layton v. Wilcox & Higginson 1944 SR 48 at 50; Dube v. Adm'r Trans-
vaal 1963 (4) SA 260 (W) at 269.
211. Van Oosten, supra note 176, at 63.
212. Id. (citing Recsei's Estate v. Meine 1943 EDL 277).
213. Strauss, supra note 1, at 70; Van Oosten, supra note 176, at 69.
214. Id. at 64 n.6 (citing VAN OOSTEN, supra note 206, at 31, 452).
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seen in context of the Constitution as an infringement of one's right to bod-
ily integrity as contemplated in terms of section 12(2)(b). 215
The onus of proving non-disclosure liability rests with the patient or
the state, depending upon whether it is a civil action or a criminal prosecu-
tion.216 Once a prima facie case of non-disclosure has been established, the
doctor will have to refute the allegation of non-disclosure by adducing
evidence that the requisite disclosure has indeed taken place.217 Van Oos-
ten opines in this regard that since disclosure documents and consent forms
cannot serve as a meaningful substitute for a disclosure conversation, the
former should be afforded evidential value, but should not be considered as
conclusive evidence that the requisite disclosure in fact occurred. 218
D. Matters ofProof and Gathering ofEvidence
1. Matters of Proof
a. General
The onus of establishing civil liability for medical negligence on the doc-
tor's part lies with the patient in a civil case and the prosecution in a
criminal case. In a civil case liability must be established on a prepon-
derance of probabilities. In a criminal case the guilt of the accused must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt.219
215. See CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 676.
216. In this regard Van Oosten states that, in the unlikely event of a doctor being charged with
culpable homicide or sued for damages for causing the death of the patient by non-disclosure, it will not
only have to be proved that the non-disclosure unlawfully or wrongly caused the patient's death, but
also that it was reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances. VAN OOSTEN, supra note 206, at 455 n.83.
217. See STRAUSS, supra note 51, at 281.
218. VAN OOSTEN, supra note 206, at 455-56.
219. Strauss, supra note 1, at 100 (citing Van Wyk v. Lewis 1924 AD 438; Mitchell v. Dixon 1914
AD 519; Touyz v. Reyneke 1994 (A) (unreported); Blyth v. Van den Heever 1980 (1) SA 191 (A) at 207;
Lee v. Schonnberg (1877) 7 Buch 136; Castell v. De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) at 420, 425; R v. Van
Schoor 1948 (4) SA 349 (C) at 349-50; Coppen v. Impey 1916 CPD 309; St Augustine Hosp. (Pty) Ltd.
v. Le Breton 1975 (2) SA 530 (D); Webb v. Isaac 1915 EDL 273; Allott v. Paterson & Jackson 1936 SR
221; Buls v. Tsatsarolakis 1976 (2) SA 891 (T) at 893; Esterhuizen v. Adm'r Transvaal 1957 (3) SA
710 (T); Pringle v. Adm'r, Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W); S v. Kramer 1987 (1) SA 887 (W) at 897);
Dale v. Hamilton 1924 WLD 184); see also CLAASSEN & VERSCHOOR, supra note 43, at 26; L.H.
HOFFMANN & D.T. ZEFFERTT, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 26 (4th ed. 1988); C.W.H.
SCHMIDT, BEWYSREG [LAW OF EVIDENCE] 23 (2000); STRAUSS & STRYDOM, supra note 43, at 274;
P.J. SWIKKARD & S.E. VAN DER MERWE, BEGINSELS VAN DIE BEWYSREG [PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE] 546-58 (2005); S.A. Strauss, Geneesheer, Pasibnt en die Reg: 'n Delikate Driehoek [Doc-
tor, Patient and the Law: a Delicate Triangle], TYDSKRIF VIR DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG [J. S. AFR.
L.] 1 (1987); Broude v. McIntosh 1998 (3) SA 60 (SCA) at 61; Oldwage v. Louwrens [2004] I All SA
532 (C). Note that, should the plaintiff be unable to prove his/her case on a preponderance of probabili-
ties, judgment will be given in favour of the defendant; a court may, however, also order absolution
from the instance. In delict, the plaintiff bears the onus to prove a wrongful act/omission on the part of
the physician, as well as the element of fault (in the form of negligence) and that the act or omission
caused him to suffer damages or personal injury. See HOFFMANN & ZEFFERTT, supra, at 496; SCHMIDT,
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In proceedings before an Inquest Court, the presiding magistrate has to
make a finding on a preponderance of probabilities, 220 and in disciplinary
proceedings before a disciplinary committee of the HPCSA, the pro forma-
supra, at 39; Matthews v. Young 1922 AD 492; Botha v. Van Niekerk 1947 (1) SA 699 (T). Where a
defendant raises a special defence such as consent, contributory negligence, or prescription, the onus of
proof will be on the defendant. See HOFFMANN & ZEFFERTT, supra, at 530; SCHMIDT, supra, at 41, 132;
Mabaso v. Felix 1981 (3) SA 865 (A); Joubert v. Combrinck 1980 (3) SA 680 (T); see also SWIKKARD
& VAN DER MERWE, supra, at 546. The state has to prove all the elements of the crime (in this case
culpable homicide, where it is alleged that the medical practitioner negligently caused the death of the
patient) beyond reasonable doubt, i.e., an act or omission which unlawfully and negligently caused the
death of the patient.
220. Cf Inquests Act 58 of 1959, § 16(2) (with reference to the phrase "prima facie"); cf Claas-
sens v. Landdros Bloemfontein 1964 (4) SA 4 (0). The proof of medical negligence is important in
context of judicial inquests, specifically where a patient died due to unnatural causes (e.g., the anaes-
thetic death) and the possible negligence of the attending physician has to be investigated (mention can
be made of the form GW 7/24 to be completed in terms of § 56 of the Health Professions Act, as
amended, in context of anaesthetic deaths); the judicial inquest is often the "front runner" of a later
criminal prosecution on a charge of culpable homicide against a physician. It is to be noted that a
judicial inquest is not a criminal trial but an inquisitorial inquiry aimed at transparency for the admini-
stration of justice and to install confidence. See Timol v. Magistrate Johannesburg 1972 (2) SA 281 (T)
at 278H-288A; see also Wessels v. Additional Magistrate Johannesburg 1983 (1) SA 530 (T) at 532E-
532G; S v. Ramaligela 1983 (2) SA 424 (V) at 430D.
At the inquest, conducted by a magistrate or a judge, the presiding officer will have before
him/her the post mortem report and other documentation relevant to the death of the patient. Normally
the pathologist/doctor who conducted the post mortem examination will be subpoenaed to testify at the
inquest. In terms of § 16(2) of the Inquests Act, the presiding officer has the duty to make the following
findings: a) the identity of the deceased; b) the cause or likely cause of death; c) the date of death; d)
whether the death has been caused by an act or omission on the part of someone that prima facie consti-
tutes an offence-the only relevant offence here in context of medical negligence is culpable homicide.
At the end of the inquest an assessment has to be made whether on the evidence as a whole, all the
elements for this crime, on a preponderance of probabilities are present. Clearly the findings in terms of
the said section 16(2)(b) and (d) are paramount with reference to a possible criminal prosecution against
a doctor. In this respect the post mortem examination and the report of the pathologist are vital. If the
presiding officer makes a positive finding in respect of section 16(2)(d) he or she is obliged to submit
the inquest record to the Director of Public Prosecutions who will then as a matter of course normally
decide to institute criminal prosecution. In addition, a copy of the inquest record is submitted to the
Registrar of the HPCSA to assess whether disciplinary proceedings on account of unprofessional con-
duct should be instituted against the doctor. See Health Professions Act § 45(2); Suid-Afrikaanse
Geneeskundige & Tandheelkundige Raad v. Strauss 1980 (2) SA 354 (T) at 212. A doctor, subpoenaed
to testify at an inquest, is not obliged to answer self-incriminating questions. See Magmoed v. Janse
Van Rensburg 1991 SACR 185 (C); In re Mjoli, 1994 (2) SA 815 (T); see generally STRAUSS, supra
note 51, at 437; Strauss, supra note 1, at 156 n. 1 (pointing out that a "person" for purposes of the In-
quests Act, does not include a stillborn baby); Van Heerden v. Joubert (1994) (4) SA 793(A) (in which
Van Heerden v. Joubert 1992 (T) (unreported) was overruled); see also I. GORDON, R. TURNER & T.W.
PRICE, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 333-34 (3d ed. 1953); cf Carstens, supra note 176, at 313-18; T.G.
SCHWAR, J.A. LOUBSER & J.D. OLIVIER, DIE ABC VAN GEREGTELIKE GENEESKUNDE [THE ABC OF
FORENSIC MEDICINE] 412 (1984). As to the role of assessors and forensic pathologists at inquests, see R
v. Solomons 1959 (2) SA 352 (A); T.T. Noguchi & L. Sathyavavgiswaran, The Role of Forensic Pa-
thologists in the Quality Assurance and Safety of the Patient Care, in PUBLISHED CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS OF 15m WORLD CONGRESS ON MEDICAL LAW SYDNEY AUSTRALIA 26 (2004); T.T.
Noguchi, Medical Malpractice Claims and Quality Improvement as Viewed by a Forensic Pathologist,
56 JAPANESE J. LEGAL MED. 205 (2002); see also K. Milller & G. Saayman, Forensic Science in Medi-
cine: What a Doctor Should Know, 45 S. AFR. FAM. PRAC. 41 (2003); G. Saayman & F.F.W. van
Oosten, Forensic Medicine in South Africa-Time for Change?, 13 MED. & L. 129 (1994).
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complainant has to prove the charges of unprofessional conduct against the
respondent-medical practitioner on a preponderance of probabilities. 221
It is to be noted, by way of a summary, that generally the application
of the maxim of res ipsa loquitur is treated by the courts as a particular
form of inferential reasoning, requiring careful scrutiny and giving rise to
an inference of negligence rather than a presumption of negligence. 222 The
South African courts thus far have been reluctant to apply the maxim to
cases of medical negligence. Recent case law, however, suggests that the
maxim could only be invoked where the medical negligence alleged de-
pends on absolutes and the evidence shows that a particular result would
not have followed but for the alleged negligence. 223 Persuasive arguments
have been put forward that the maxim should be applied in specific circum-
221. The nature of the proceeding before a disciplinary committee of the Professional Board for
Medical and Dental Practitioners of the HPCSA has been discussed in some detail in case law. See De
La Rouviere v. S. Africa. Med. & Dental Council 1977 (1) SA 85 (N) at 97; De Beer v. Health Profes-
sions Council of S. Africa 2005 (1) SA 332 (T); VRM v. Health Professions Council of S. Africa 2003
JOL 11944 (T); Thuketana v. Health Professions Council of S. Africa 2002 4 All SA 493 (T); Veriava v.
President S. African Med & Dental Council 1985 (2) SA 293 (T) at 307; Pretorius v. S. Africa
Geneeskundige & Tandheelkundige Raad 1980 (2) SA 354 (T) at 358-59; see also STRAUSS, supra note
51, at 369; Carstens, supra note 176, at 318-24; J. Taitz, The Disciplinary Powers of the South African
Medical and Dental Council, in I ACTA JURIDICA 56 (1988); J. Taitz, Review of the Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings of the Medical and Dental Council, 105 S. AFR. L. J. 25 (1988). Note that the HPCSA is not an
organ of state. Korf v. Health Professions Council of S. Africa 2000 (1) SA 1171 (T); Mistry v. Interim
Nat'I Med. and Dental Council of S. Africa [1997] 3 All SA 519 (D). Disciplinary committees of the
Professional Board for Medical and Dental Practitioners function as quasi-judicial administrative
tribunals and are bound by the constitutional provisions as articulated in section 33 of the Bill of Rights
and the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. See M. Beukes, The
Constitutional Foundation of the Implementation and Interpretation of the Promotion ofAdministrative
Justice Act, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW: SOUTH AFRICA'S PROMOTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACTS I (C. Lange & J. Wessels eds., 2004). Disciplinary committees are thus
legally bound to conduct hearings against medical practitioners with procedural fairness, which includes
reasonableness, and to provide adequate reasons for their decisions. See C. Hoexter, Unreasonableness
in the Administrative Justice Act, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW, supra, at 148; J. Wessels, 'Adequate rea-
sons' in Terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW, supra, at 116-
32. Decisions of a disciplinary committee of a Professional Board for Medical and Dental Practitioners
of the HPCSA may be taken on review to the High Court. See J.R. DE VILLE, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 384-85 (2003). In context of the nature and scope of
evidence to be led at a disciplinary hearing against a medical practitioner, it is significant to note what
was stated by Judge Ramsbottom in McLoughlin v. South African Medical & Dental Council 1947 (2)
SA 377 (W) at 395:
The [Medical] Council and the Disciplinary Committee are bodies of a different kind. They
are entrusted with the most important duties; they have the power to compel the attendance of
witnesses; evidence is given on oath and any person who gives false evidence on oath before
the Council or the committee or who refuses to answer commits and offence; the parties have
the right to counsel and witnesses are examined and cross-examined; a legal assessor may be
appointed 'to advise on matters of law procedure and evidence' . . . . In my opinion a body of
this kind [the Medical Council] should be held much more strictly to the rules of procedure
and evidence than a body such as [the council of clubs, trade unions, and the like.]"
Id. (emphasis added).
222. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 100.
223. Pringle v. Adm'r, Transvaal 1990 (2) SA 379 (W).
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stances with regard to the proof of medical negligence. 224 In this respect,
general principles for the effective application of the maxim in cases of
medical negligence are advanced, inter alia, that principles of procedural
equality and constitutional considerations dictate that the maxim be applied
in cases of medical negligence.
As a general rule of evidence, a plaintiff in a medical negligence ac-
tion is required to present expert medical evidence in support of allegations
thereof. In this regard, expert medical evidence is pivotal in support or
defence of medical negligence. 225 The South African Supreme Court of
Appeal in the case of Michael v. Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd. had the
opportunity to enunciate the general applicable considerations in assessing
expert medical evidence. 226
b. Gathering ofEvidence
For the purpose of gathering evidence pertaining to medical negli-
gence, there are different rules which may be invoked to obtain such evi-
dence, depending on the forum in which the doctor's or hospital's
negligence is adjudicated. In a criminal trial and in inquest proceedings, the
doctor may request certain sections (documents like sworn statements)
from the police docket and may also request further particulars for purposes
of trial.227 At disciplinary hearings against a doctor before the Professional
Board of the Health Professions Council of South Africa on a charge of
professional misconduct (inclusive of alleged medical negligence), the
defendant-doctor (respondent) is also entitled to further particulars to the
224. Patrick van den Heever, The Application of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Medical
Negligence Cases: A Comparative Survey 63, 329-32 (Jan. 2002) (unpublished LLD thesis, University
of Pretoria), available at http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-08062007-165205/.
225. Plaintiffs often find it difficult to obtain medical experts who are prepared to testify against
their colleagues. This resistance is described in the literature as a "conspiracy of silence," a term coined
in the United States. See D. GIESEN, INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 513 n.7 (1988) ("It
is a matter of common knowledge, often mentioned in judicial opinion and other authorities, that the
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case is often unable to find a medical expert willing to testify against
a fellow physician. . . . It goes without saying that the plaintiffs inability to obtain favourable expert
testimony poses the possibility of great miscarriage of justice."); cf STRAUSS, supra note 51, at 245;
Melvin M. Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, I VILL. L. REv. 250
(1956); L. Norton, Ethics in Medicine and Law: Standards and Conflicts, LEGAL MED. ANN. 206
(1977); see also Melvin M. Belli, "Ready for the Plaintiff7," 30 TEMP. L.Q. 408, 434 (1957) (warning
the medical profession "for Hippocrates' sake . . . [i]n your own enlightened self-interest, break this
conspiracy before the public does it for you!"). Although there is a greater willingness amongst medical
practitioners to testify against fellow practitioners, specifically in cases of gross negligence, it seems
that it is still problematic for plaintiffs to readily acquire the services of medical experts in this regard.
226. 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) at 1200A-1201F; see CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 861
(discussing this case).
227. Criminal Procedure Act 55 of 1977 § 87; see also Shabalala & Five Others v. Attorney-Gen.
of the Transvaal 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC); S v. Shiburi 2004 (2) SACR 314 (W).
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charge, as well as the initial letter of complaint of the patient originally
lodged with the Registrar, and the findings of the prelim committee who
assessed the prima facie merits of the case against the doctor.228 In the
context of civil litigation, patient-plaintiffs may invoke the Promotion of
Access to Information Act, to obtain access to medical records and other
related information.229 The Act was introduced "[t]o give effect to the con-
stitutional right of access to any information held by the State and any in-
formation held by another person and that is required for the exercise or
protection of any rights." 230 It should, however, be noted that the Act does
not apply to medical records and related medical information requested for
civil proceedings after the commencement of the proceedings. 231 Where
legal proceedings in a medical negligence action have commenced, there is
a strict discovery procedure to be followed for the production and discov-
ery of expert medical reports, and similar documents (inclusive of a pre-
trial conference) as prescribed, inter alia, by the Rules of the Supreme
Court Act.232
III. AVAILABLE EMPIRICAL DATA ON MEDICAL ERRORS AND ADVERSE
EVENTS, THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO PREVENT
AND/OR REDRESS SUCH ERRORS AND EVENTS, AND THE PREVALENCE AND
IMPACT OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE MEDICAL ERRORS AND
ADVERSE EVENTS, IMPROVE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE, OR REDUCE SYSTEM
COSTS
Obtaining empirical data on medical negligence in South Africa has
proved very difficult. Despite numerous phone calls and e-mails to officials
in the National Department of Health, the various Provincial Departments
of Health, the National Department of Justice, the Health Professions
Council of South Africa, and the Medical Protection Society, not a single
piece of empirical data was provided by any of these parties. Web-sites for
the most part do not provide up-to-date, detailed information. This left the
authors out in the cold, turning to media reports for answers. It has been
reported, for instance, that "[n]early 2,000 doctors in public and private
228. Cf CARSTENS & PEARMAIN, supra note 1, at 269.
229. Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000.
230. Id. pmbl. The Act was introduced to give effect to the provisions of section 32 of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which governs access to information.
231. Id. § 7; see THE RIGHT TO KNOw, supra note 221 (discussing and analyzing the Act); see also
Unitas Hospital v. Van Wyk [20061 SCA 32 (RSA).
232. Rules of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 R. 35-37; see also E. MORRIS, TECHNIQUE IN
LITIGATION 114 (J. Mullins & C. Da Silva eds., 2010).
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healthcare in South Africa are facing claims of negligence." 233 According
to one media report, "[a]bout 80% of the claims stem from incidents in the
public health sector."234 It has been claimed that over a two year period
doctors in South Africa's "public hospitals have cost taxpayers more than
RI billion in lawsuits because of botched operations." 235
The KwaZulu-Natal Health Department apparently spent R376m in
2008/2009, and R547m in 2009/2010 on lawsuits. 236 Three weeks into the
new financial year, the provincial department had paid out R87m in medi-
cal legal bills and had 294 cases pending.237 The province of Mpumalanga
spent R666,643 in 2008/2009, and R19m in 2009/2010 on medically re-
lated legal bills.238 Gauteng spent R2.8m in 2008/2009, and RIOm in
2009/2010 on medical legal fees.239 The Western Cape spent R4m in
2008/2009, and R6m in 2009/2010.240 The North West Province spent
Rll.5m in 2008/2009, and R1.7m in 2009/2010.241 The Free State Health
Department paid out R916,000 in 2008/2009, and R577,000 in
2009/2010.242 The Eastern Cape spent more than R8m on legal fees in
2009/2010.243
Many cases are settled out of court-perhaps as much as 70% of all
claims.244 It has been reported, for instance, that in May 2010 four cases of
medical negligence were settled in Johannesburg, with payouts of up to
R7m.245
According to figures claimed in media reports to have been obtained
from the Medical Protection Society, more than 800 of its members
(+3.08%) are facing active claims of alleged negligence, with another 1,000
complaints still be to assessed. 246 In his report for 2009, the Chief Execu-
tive of the MPS-a membership organisation with more than 270,000
members in over forty countries-reported "poor claims experience" for
233. Subashni Naidoo, Thousands of Doctors 'Negligent,' SUNDAY TIMES, June 6, 2010,
http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article489475.ece/Thousands-of-doctors-negligent.
234. Id.
235. Edwin Naidu, Botched Operations Blight SA, THE SUNDAY INDEPENDENT, May 2, 2010,
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/botched-operations-blight-sa-1.482422.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id
241. Id
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Naidoo, supra note 233.
245. Id
246. Id.
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the organisation as a whole, and remarked that "[t]he worst of the adverse
claims experience has been in the UK and South Africa, although we are
beginning to see a rise in both the frequency and average size of claims in
most countries in which we operate around the world."247 He expressed
major concern about the "quite startling increase in the value of high claims
in the UK, where some settlements have leapt by 40% or more as compared
with similar claims settled in the recent past," and remarked that "a similar
worrying trend is also beginning to emerge in South Africa." 248 The MPS
promotes safer practice by running risk management and education pro-
grammes to reduce avoidable harms.249 A confidential counselling service
for members was introduced in South Africa in 2009, and has reportedly
been very favourably received by members.250 Medico-legal consultants
are available round-the-clock to help members with legal and ethical di-
lemmas arising from their professional practice, clinical negligence claims,
complaints, disciplinary procedures, police investigations, regulatory in-
quiries, inquests, and the like.
"Most claims relate to botched cosmetic surgery, children born with
brain damage, birth defects not diagnosed timeously and Caesarean sec-
tions not done when needed." 251 It should be noted that South African law
recognises actions for wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth, but not
wrongful life. Not surprisingly, the subscription rate for specialists doing
obstetrics and gynaecology tops the list at R130,540 for the year January 1,
2010, through December 31, 2010.252 Plastic and reconstructive surgeons
fall in the "very high risk" category with a corresponding subscription rate.
Claims worth more than Rim account for over 18% of the total num-
ber.253 This amounts to an increase of nearly 550% in ten years. Claims for
amounts above R5m have increased nine fold in the past decade. 254 Several
claims have been brought for amounts in excess of R30m. 255
247. MEDICAL PROTECTION SOCIETY, FINANCIAL STABILITY IN CHALLENGING TIMES: ANNUAL
REPORT AND ACCOUNTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2009, 2 (2010), available at
http://www.medicalprotection.org/Default.aspx?DN=609d6af5-5421-49a4-baeb-f5fa0cb2b3bf.
248. Id. He indicated that this worrying trend will inevitably mean higher subscriptions for all UK
members. Id.
249. Id. at 3.
250. Id
251. Naidoo, supra note 233.
252. Subscription Rates, MEDICAL PROTECTION SOCIETY, http://www.medicalprotection.org/
southafrica/membership/subscription (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
253. Naidoo, supra note 233.
254. Id
255. Id.
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According to media reports, statistics from the Health Professions
Council of South Africa show that the names of forty-four medical practi-
tioners have been removed from the register since 2005 as a result of hav-
ing been found guilty of unprofessional conduct. 256
Between April 2008 and March 2009, approximately ninety medical
practitioners were found guilty of unprofessional conduct.257 The conduct
complained of included insufficient care, refusing to treat patients, misdi-
agnosis, practising outside the particular practitioner's scope of compe-
tence, overcharging, and charging for services not rendered.258 Between
January 2008 and October 2008, forty-seven practitioners were found
guilty of unprofessional conduct relating to substandard service or inade-
quate treatment. 259
IV. ATTITUDES AND CONCERNS ABOUT THE LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
The medical malpractice and compensation scenario in South Africa
cannot be properly understood without an insight into the broader socio-
economic and, specifically, healthcare situation in the country. South Af-
rica is a developing nation, with pockets of highly developed infrastructure
and highly trained and skilled people. "Health care varies from the most
basic primary services provided by the State for free" to the indigent, "to
highly specialised hi-tech services available in both the public and private
sectors." 260 The total population in South Africa is in the order of 49 mil-
lion. "The private sector spends about R66-billion to service 7-million peo-
ple" through private medical insurance. 261 This sector also provides
services "to foreigners looking for top-quality surgical procedures at rela-
tively affordable prices." 262 The public sector spends about R59 billion on
the rest of the population. 263 This amounts to 3.05% of the GDP. 264 In
April 2006, there were 33,220 doctors registered with the HPCSA in pri-
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Categorisation of Finalised Professional Conduct Inquiries (January 2008-October 2008),
HEALTH PROFESSIONS COUNCIL OF SOuTH AFRICA, http://www.hpcsa.co.za/downloads/conduct-ethics/
conduct inquiries 2008.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
260. Healthcare in South Africa, MEDIACLUBSOUTHAFRICA, http://www.mediaclubsouthafrica.
com/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=102:healthcare&catid=34:developmentbg (last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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vate and public practice combined.265 Two thousand Tunisian doctors and
450 Cuban doctors are deployed in rural areas. 266 Transforming measures
(encompassing legislation, health care policies and public-private partner-
ships) for the health sector are envisioned. 267 Poverty and other poverty-
related diseases like tuberculosis and cholera place a huge strain on the
health system, but HIV/AIDS poses the biggest threat.268 South Africa has
the fifth highest number of notified tuberculosis cases in the world.269
Over five million South Africans live with HIV. At this moment, half-a-
million are sick with AIDS and require antiretroviral treatment. The ma-
jority still struggle to access it. More than two years ago the Department
of Health committed to placing 380,000 people on treatment. . . (in the
Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management
and Treatment for South Africa, published 19 November 2003). Yet only
36% of this target has been met.... [M]illions more are at risk ....
[S]uffering is being hidden behind a veil of state-supported AIDS denial-
ism.270
We are still reaping the consequences thereof. Currently, there is a National
Strategic Plan in place to address challenges posed by HIV/AIDS with
increased expenditure.
One of the biggest challenges facing the South African system of li-
ability and compensation for medical malpractice is the shortage of quali-
fied health care practitioners. "Doctors and nurses carry a very heavy
workload because of vacancies, an increase in the number of patients com-
ing for treatment and lack of resources." 271 The chairman of the South
African Medical Association, Norman Mabasa, said that the current inci-
dence of medical malpractice is the result of "the skills shortage in the pub-
lic health system." 272 Exhaustion is common.273 Mabasa has said that
"[j]unior doctors are forced to work without supervisions and there is seri-
ous neglect in terms of nursing care." 274 The ombudsman of the Health
Professions Council of South Africa, Abdul Barday, also acknowledged
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id
269. Id.
270. Memorandum Handed over to UN and SA Government in Pretoria on 30 May, TREATMENT
ACTION CAMPAIGN (May 30, 2006), http://www.tac.org.zalcommunity/node/2206.
271. Naidu, supra note 235.
272. Id.; Naidoo, supra note 233.
273. Naidu, supra note 235; Naidoo, supra note 233.
274. Naidoo, supra note 233.
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that "doctors in provincial hospitals worked under trying conditions." 275
"Analysis of figures for registered doctors in relation to the general popula-
tion and international standards," based on 2004 figures, "indicates that
South Africa is substantially better supplied with doctors than its immedi-
ate neighbors, but grossly undersupplied when compared to many devel-
oped countries." 276 South Africa had a rate of 7.7 medical practitioners per
10,000 population, whilst Austria, for instance, had a rate of thirty-five, and
Canada a rate of twenty-one. 277 Vast amounts of money are spent to edu-
cate health care workers who are lost to developed nations as a result of
recruitment. In 2001, there were almost 1,500 South African doctors in
Canada; 17% of all doctors in Saskatchewan earned their first medical de-
gree in South Africa. 278
The president of the South African Association of Personal Injury
Lawyers, Ronald Bobroff, attributes the high number of negligence cases in
the private and state sectors to a lack of accountability and poor manage-
ment.279 Ambulance services, for instance, do not always respond time-
ously, resulting in lawsuits. 280 This is attributed to poor management and
the use of unsuitable vehicles. 281
Health Minister Dr. Aaron Motsoaledi is reported to have said that the
amount paid out in lawsuits was unacceptable. 282 Motsoaledi has told Par-
liament's portfolio committee on health that he planned to commission an
investigation into the reasons for the increase in litigation and the state of
care in public hospitals. 283 The Nyathi case illustrates how difficult it can
be, especially for the indigent, to successfully claim damages from, and
enforce judgment against, the state.284 Poorer members of the community
not only face the higher risks associated with an understaffed and under-
resourced public health sector, but also the hurdle of high legal costs.
275. Naidu, supra note 235.
276. The Shortage of Medical Doctors in South Africa: Scarce and Critical Skills Research Project,
DEP'T OF LABOUR 12 (March 2008), http://www.labour.gov.za/downloads/documents/research-
documents/Medical Doctors DoLReport.pdf.
277. Id. at 12, 15.
278. Amy Jo Ehman & Patrick Sullivan, South Africa Appeals to Canada to Stop Recruiting Its
MDs, 164 (3) CAN. MED. ASs'N J. 387 (2001), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC80740/pdf/20010206s00029p387.pdf.
279. Naidoo, supra note 233.
280. Naidu, supra note 235.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Nyathi v. MECfor Dep't ofHealth, Gauteng 2008 (5) SA 94 (CC).
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Another concern is the fact that "the conspiracy of silence" is still a
reality. Reported medical negligence actions where judgment is given
against the medical practitioner remain relatively scarce.
The rise in litigation can perhaps not be attributed purely to a rise in
the incidence of negligence. As a result of a greater actualisation of consti-
tutional rights, there has been an increase in access to information, trans-
parency, and accountability through the recently enacted legislation. It is
submitted that this, together with greater consumer awareness, may have
led to an increase in medical litigation. Greater specialisation in medicine
and the less personal nature of the relationship between specialists and
patients is another possible contributing factor.
